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Abstract
Outcome-adaptive randomization (OAR) has been proposed as a corrective to cer-
tain ethical difficulties inherent in the traditional randomized clinical trial (RCT) 
using fixed-ratio randomization. In particular, it has been suggested that OAR 
redresses the balance between individual and collective ethics in favour of the for-
mer. In this paper, I examine issues of welfare and autonomy arising in relation to 
OAR. A central issue in discussions of welfare in OAR is equipoise, and the moral 
status of OAR is crucially influenced by the way in which this concept is construed. 
If OAR is based on a model of equipoise that demands strict indifference between 
competing interventions throughout the trial, such equipoise is disturbed by accru-
ing data favouring one treatment over another; OAR seeks to redress this by weight-
ing randomization to the seemingly superior treatment. However, this is a partial 
response, as patients continue to be allocated to the inferior therapy. Moreover, it 
rests upon considerations of aggregate harms and benefits, and does not therefore 
uphold individual ethics. Issues of fairness also arise, as early and late enrollees 
are randomized on a different basis. Fixed-ratio randomization represents a fuller 
and more consistent response to a loss of equipoise, as so construed. With regard to 
consent, the complexity of OAR poses challenges to adequate disclosure and com-
prehension. Additionally, OAR does not offer a remedy to the therapeutic miscon-
ception—participants’ tendency to attribute treatment allocation in an RCT to indi-
vidual clinical judgments, rather than to scientific considerations—and, if anything, 
accentuates rather than alleviates this misconception. In relation to these issues, 
OAR fails to offer ethical advantages over fixed-ratio randomization. More broadly, 
the ethical basis of OAR can be seen to lie more in collective than in individual eth-
ics, and overall it fares worse in this territory than fixed-ratio randomization.
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Introduction
Recent advances in randomized clinical trials (RCTs) include the use of adaptive 
designs. Such studies incorporate changes to trial design as the study proceeds, 
including changes to randomization [1]. Covariate-adaptive randomization, for 
example, modifies allocation to achieve optimum balance between groups on base-
line characteristics. Outcome-adaptive randomization (OAR) also adjusts the alloca-
tion of participants, but on the basis of accruing outcome data—provided that such 
data are available in a suitably timely manner—such that participants are allocated 
with greater probability to the treatment that hitherto appears to be superior. In a 
traditional RCT, however, randomization is in a fixed ratio (usually 1:1). This allo-
cation persists throughout the duration of the trial, unless a planned interim anal-
ysis leads to its early termination or to an arm being dropped prior to the end of 
the study. Allocation of participants in traditional RCTs is therefore independent of 
any accruing data, in contrast to the dynamic method of randomization used within 
OAR.
There is a broad literature on the methodological and statistical aspects of OAR. 
More recently, a number of articles have addressed some of its ethical implications 
[2–13]. This paper seeks to contribute to this discussion in the context of a simple 
two-arm RCT,1 with a particular focus on two central ethical issues: welfare and 
autonomy. I argue that OAR faces challenges in relation to each of these issues.
Protecting participant welfare
A method that minimizes the allocation of participants to a putatively inferior treat-
ment appears to be ethically advantageous. In particular, it has been suggested that 
OAR has the merit of favouring the notion of individual, as opposed to collective, 
ethics [7, 18–21]—a distinction developed in the specific context of clinical trials by 
Joseph Lellouch and Daniel Schwartz:
Un schéma expérimental ou une stratégie sont basés sur l’éthique collective 
s’ils permettent de maximiser le “bénéfice” total du groupe et qu’ils se fondent 
au contraire sur l’éthique individuelle, s’ils permettent de maximiser le “béné-
fice” de chaque sujet, pris individuellement, au moment où on a à le traiter. 
[22, p. 128]2
1 I follow Spencer Hey and Jonathan Kimmelman’s [2] landmark paper in focusing on the two-arm case. 
It has been argued by some [14–17] that in terms of certain methodological and statistical characteristics, 
OAR has more to offer in multi-arm trials than in two-arm trials—though merits are nonetheless claimed 
for the two-arm case [14]. However, most of the ethical issues to be discussed apply to both the two-arm 
and the multi-arm context; instances in which different considerations may apply will be noted.
2 This translates as: An experimental design or strategy is based on collective ethics if it conduces to 
maximizing the total benefit of the group, and conversely it is founded on individual ethics if it conduces 
to maximizing benefit for each participant, taken individually, at the point at which treatment is to be 
given.
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Broadly, therefore, collective ethics justifies actions in terms of their aggregate ben-
efit or reduction of harm. Clinical research can thereby be morally justified on the 
basis of the benefits that are expected to flow to future patients or to the population 
at large. On this way of thinking, such benefits, owing to their larger scale, may jus-
tifiably outweigh any harm or loss of benefit that may arise in respect of the smaller 
number of individual participants within the study, provided that such harm or loss 
of benefit is minimized. Individual ethics, on the other hand, places emphasis on 
the welfare of the individual. In particular, it resists subjugation of the individual’s 
interests to those of a broader collectivity. The moral reasoning underlying collec-
tive ethics is fundamentally consequentialist, whereby the criterion of right action 
is ultimately the aggregate balance of harms and benefits. In contrast, the reasoning 
underlying individual ethics is closer to deontology, in which the criterion of right 
action is centred on appraising benefits and harms in relation to specific individu-
als. Deontology insists that moral decision-making should take account of the ‘dis-
tinction between persons’ [23, p. 134] and should not analyse harms and benefits 
solely at an aggregate level. The distinction between collective and individual ethics 
is often mapped onto that between the role of researcher and the role of clinician, 
respectively [24–27].
Importantly, Lellouch and Schwartz [22], and others [24, 27–29], interpret indi-
vidual ethics literally, in terms of the individual patient. A different interpretation is 
to contrast individual and collective ethics in terms of ‘doing what it best for current 
subjects in the trial versus doing what is best for future patients’ [21, p. 174]. This 
suggests not so much a contrast between the individual and the collectivity as one 
between two collectivities—one (smaller) consisting of the patients in the trial and 
another (larger) consisting of future patients who stand to benefit from the results of 
the trial. However, the more plausible construal of individual ethics—to be adopted 
here—is in terms of the welfare of each person, taken singly.
Equipoise
A principle in the ethics of RCTs that is advanced in support of individual ethics 
is equipoise. There are somewhat different interpretations of the principle [30], but 
they have in common the notion that random allocation to the interventions tested 
within an RCT is ethically justified if there is uncertainty as to their relative effec-
tiveness. As originally formulated by Charles Fried [31], what has come to be known 
as ‘theoretical’ (or ‘individual’) equipoise requires that the individual investigator be 
indifferent as to the relative effectiveness of the interventions. Subsequently, Benja-
min Freedman [32] developed a form of ‘clinical’ (or ‘community’) equipoise that 
locates this uncertainty at the level of the clinical community, such that what matters 
ethically is that there is indifference among clinicians in general as to the optimum 
treatment, regardless of whether individual practitioners have treatment preferences. 
Crucially, if the demands of equipoise (on either definition) are satisfied, patients 
are not knowingly disadvantaged by being randomized to one arm of the trial rather 
than another. Nicolas Fillion [13] points out that an additional requirement on a trial 
is that it should be capable of disturbing—or at least contributing to disturbing—the 
86 J. Sim 
1 3
state of equipoise that existed at the outset; so equipoise must exist, but it must also 
be assailable.
Two models of equipoise in outcome‑adaptive randomization
Equipoise has been discussed by several authors in specific relation to OAR [2, 
9–13]. However, an analysis of the ethics of OAR depends crucially on how equi-
poise is conceived. The distinction between theoretical and clinical equipoise out-
lined above is based on where equipoise is judged—at the level of the individual 
investigator or at that of the clinical community. A more pressing concern for the 
ethics of OAR, however, is how emerging evidence is acted upon in relation to equi-
poise. A somewhat different distinction is therefore required between two models of 
equipoise. On one reading, which I refer to as E1, data emerging from the trial that 
appear to favour one intervention over another serve to disturb the state of equipoise 
immediately and thereby create a correspondingly immediate moral imperative to 
increase the probability that participants will be allocated to the better-performing 
intervention. Thus, Scott Saxman notes:
Outcome-adaptive randomized trials start out in equipoise, but equipoise is 
disturbed as soon as data are available from the first group of patients enrolled 
into the study and the randomization is adapted to favor the ‘better’ treatment 
arm. [9, p. 63]
The second reading of equipoise, which I label E2, is offered by Alex London [11] 
and Laura Bothwell and Aaron Kesselheim [12], who advance a different relation-
ship between emerging data and the adjustment of randomization weights from that 
proposed within E1. London argues that OAR is compatible with clinical equipoise 
because the latter does not require that randomization probabilities should be equal:
If it is consistent with concern for welfare for a patient to be directly treated 
with A or B or C (to receive that intervention with certainty), then it cannot 
violate concern for welfare if that patient is assigned to those interventions 
with any distribution of probabilities that sums to 1. [11, p. 412]
This is persuasive. If k is the number of treatments under test, it does not matter 
ethically that some participants are randomized to treatment A with a probability 
less than 1/k, since treatment A is regarded as optimum by a portion of the expert 
community (even if the other treatments under test are preferred by a larger portion 
of the community). It is common for trials using fixed-ratio randomization (FRR) to 
employ unbalanced randomization in order to gather fuller information on one treat-
ment than another, or because access to one treatment is more limited than access to 
another, or because doing so secures greater statistical power in certain multi-arm 
trials [33].3 In terms of London’s argument, this practice is acceptable.
3 These are specific circumstances; as a general rule, unbalanced randomization leads to reduced statisti-
cal power.
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However, when one considers OAR, the issue is not simply the presence of 
unequal randomization weights, but their adjustment—and specifically, their 
adjustment on the grounds of participant welfare. London maintains that OAR is 
consistent with clinical equipoise because:
even if rational inquirers recognise that initial evidence from a clinical trial 
supports the clinical merits of one intervention (A) over the others (B or C), 
that evidence may not be strong enough to lead responsible experts to alter 
their recommendation, or to alter the recommendation of every expert in 
that community. [11, p. 413]
Interventions B and C therefore remain admissible treatments within the trial not-
withstanding such initial evidence—their appropriateness is not questioned under 
E2 in the way that it would be under E1. While this argument reconciles unbal-
anced randomization with clinical equipoise, it is not immediately obvious how it 
provides a moral rationale for OAR. If an existing imbalance is compatible with 
clinical equipoise, what is the motivation for adjusting it in the light of accruing 
evidence? London’s explanation is that OAR:
should be seen as modelling an idealised health system in which diverse 
communities of fully informed experts who disagree about the relative 
merits of a set of interventions shrink or grow as their constituent mem-
bers update their expert opinions in light of reliable medical evidence. In 
this view, randomisation weights are … an idealised representation of the 
probability that a patient in such an idealised learning health system would 
encounter a practitioner from these communities if they were to be allocated 
to a clinician at random. [11, p. 412]
Within E1, participant welfare depends upon the investigator’s responding con-
tinuously to accruing data, such that data favouring one intervention over another 
are evidence of its superiority and therefore disturb equipoise, requiring an 
adjustment to randomization probabilities at that juncture. In contrast, E2 does 
not regard such data as evidence of overall treatment superiority or inferiority, 
maintaining that the initial state of clinical equipoise can survive such evidence 
until such a point that differences in outcome ‘are sufficiently convincing to 
reasonably inform the medical community and clinical practice’ [12, p. 28]. In 
this way, no immediate change to randomization probabilities is required. Thus, 
within E2, participant welfare is promoted differently, by adjusting the probabil-
ity of randomization to a particular intervention in proportion to the size of the 
clinical community favouring that intervention, such that ‘patients in [an OAR] 
study have a better chance of being treated with what is ultimately recognised 
as the best treatment for their condition’ [11, p. 413]. On this account, and in 
contrast to E1, changing randomization probabilities are not a direct response to 
emerging evidence of treatment effectiveness. Instead, these data are taken as pre-
dictive of clinicians’ behaviour in response to such evidence, and it is this antici-
pated change (or lack of change) in behaviour that is reflected back to motivate 
the adjustment of randomization probabilities.
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Equipoise is clearly a more acute problem in the context of OAR under E1 than 
under E2; indeed, E2 obviates many of the equipoise-related concerns that arise 
within OAR. I do not seek here to arbitrate between these two models of equipoise 
in terms of their relative strengths and weaknesses, or otherwise privilege one 
account over the other; nor will I assess moral or epistemological challenges that 
have been made to the overall concept of equipoise [34–38]. Instead, I focus my dis-
cussion in the remainder of this section on the situation where, as commonly occurs, 
advocates of OAR base their standpoint on an interpretation of equipoise that aligns 
with E1, and I explore the challenges that such an account faces when viewed on its 
own terms.4
Responding to (loss of) equipoise under E1
It is clear that equipoise is handled differently in FRR and OAR. In both cases, the 
trial begins in a state of equipoise. In FRR, beyond any planned interim analyses, 
assessments of relative treatment effectiveness are not made, and therefore equi-
poise is not reassessed, until completion of the trial. In OAR, treatment effectiveness 
is continuously reassessed, and therefore equipoise is continuously re-evaluated; 
according to E1, if equipoise is found to be disturbed, then allocation is adjusted 
in favour of the hitherto superior treatment. The consequence, however, is that par-
ticipants are still randomized to the apparently inferior treatment, albeit at a lower 
rate. This compensates for a loss of equipoise, but it does not restore it because, for 
Saxman [9], the trialist is knowingly randomizing some participants to a treatment 
believed to be inferior.5 Judged in terms of E1, this is, on the face of it, ethically 
problematic.
The advocate of OAR might respond that because allocation is weighted towards 
the treatment judged to be superior, most patients will now receive the superior 
intervention. There are three points to note here. First, such an argument retreats 
from individual ethics, as it rests upon a notion of aggregate benefit—the fact that 
most participants will receive the superior treatment is taken to justify the continued 
allocation of a smaller group to the inferior treatment.6 This constitutes a conse-
quentialist justification, reflecting the notion of collective ethics, and any attempt to 
appeal to individual ethics in support of OAR therefore founders.
5 It should be noted that E2, as expounded by London [11], rejects such a notion of ‘belief’, since it sug-
gests an epistemologically implausible model of a single meta-agent whose beliefs regarding emerging 
data are required to be reconciled. Instead, evidence emerging from the trial is taken by London to repre-
sent a distribution of beliefs within an idealized medical community.
6 Thus, Jason Tehranisa and William Meurer argue that OAR ‘works to collectively favour the patients 
within the trial in situations when one treatment is ultimately better than the other’ [39, p. 2131] (empha-
sis added).
4 In addition, while E2 provides a clear account of idealized changes in the size of the clinical commu-
nity favouring an intervention in response to emerging evidence, and of how this might provide a motiva-
tion to alter randomization weights, it is less clear how, in practical terms, these changes might translate 
to specific decisions to adjust these weights at the level of the trial. A more developed account of how 
this might occur is needed for a full evaluation of E2 in the context of OAR.
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Second, it rests on a questionable moral logic, whereby the action taken only par-
tially fulfils the moral consideration that prompts it. Thus, Richard Royall proposes 
a more consistent response, arguing that ‘after finding enough evidence favoring A 
to require reducing the probability of B, the physician obeying the personal care 
principle must see that the next patient gets A, not just with high probability, but 
with certainty’ [40, p. 58].
Third, it depends upon what is meant by ‘most’ participants. The weighting of 
randomization in OAR appears to ensure that the proportion of participants allo-
cated to the inferior treatment in OAR is henceforth smaller than in FRR. However, 
as a trial based on OAR is likely to require more participants, at given levels of sta-
tistical significance and power, than one based on FRR, the number of participants 
allocated to the seemingly inferior treatment may be greater than under FRR [5, 41, 
42].7 Hence, it is true that within a trial OAR will normally minimize the proportion, 
and thus the number, of participants randomized to the inferior treatment. However, 
if one is considering a comparison between a trial based on OAR and one based on 
FRR—as I am here—then while the proportions will still favour OAR, the num-
bers may not. Of course, there may also be a larger number of patients allocated to 
the superior treatment under OAR than under FRR. This, however, would count in 
favour of OAR only if one were to accept a consequentialist moral calculus that per-
mits a direct trade-off between benefits and harms—a calculus that is out of keeping 
with the deontological basis of individual ethics, which would place some degree of 
prohibition on harm even in the face of a greater countervailing benefit. Moreover, 
setting aside the distribution of participants across the arms of the trial, any increase 
in the sample size, and the associated costs of a study, raises morally relevant issues 
of efficiency [2, 13, 44].8
If one considers participants across the duration of the trial, an additional dif-
ficulty emerges in respect of participants enrolled either early or late. Turning first 
to those enrolled early, Edward Korn and Boris Freidlin point out that at the outset 
of a trial using OAR there is little information on which to base the weighting of 
randomization [41]. The intention to randomize preferentially to the superior treat-
ment is therefore realized minimally, if at all, at this juncture. As such, on epistemic 
grounds, the proposed ethical merit of OAR cannot be claimed for those enrolled 
early.
Conversely, with respect to those enrolled later in the trial, as the study proceeds 
and data on outcomes accrue, the informational basis for OAR is augmented; and 
while most participants are randomized to the favoured treatment, others continue 
to be randomized to a treatment increasingly disfavoured by the data. In this way, 
7 The proviso ‘may be greater’ is stated because, depending on both the size of the study and the propor-
tion of participants assigned to the ultimately inferior treatment, there may be certain instances where 
the number receiving the inferior treatment under OAR is smaller than would be expected with 1:1 FRR, 
though the difference is likely to be modest [43]. Similarly, the total number of patients required in an 
OAR study may in certain circumstances be smaller than the number required in an FFR trial [42].
8 There is, however, evidence that under certain conditions multi-arm trials employing OAR may be 
more efficient than two-arm OAR trials, and sometimes more efficient than a multi-arm trial with FFR 
[15, 16].
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some individuals enrolled late in the trial receive a treatment that is strongly disfa-
voured by the accumulating data, which does not uphold participant welfare under 
E1. Accordingly, any moral justification for allocating participants to the apparently 
inferior treatment becomes increasingly tenuous as the trial proceeds. So, in differ-
ent but equally problematic ways, ethical difficulties occur with OAR vis-à-vis both 
early and late enrollees—for the former, no benefit seems to accrue through OAR in 
terms of welfare, and for some of the latter, a loss of such benefit is countenanced.
For Saxman [9], the fact that early and late participants have differing probabili-
ties of receiving the ostensibly superior intervention is problematic for justice as it 
applies to the fair distribution of benefits and burdens. Relevant here is a consid-
eration of procedural justice, which specifically concerns the processes and meth-
ods whereby benefits or burdens are allocated. One can note that, throughout the 
course of the study, OAR allocates all participants (except for the very first) with 
greater likelihood to the apparently superior treatment, according to the current state 
of knowledge at the time of enrolment. In terms of what John Rawls [45] calls pure 
procedural justice—whereby, once the procedure of allocation is deemed just, there 
is no separate criterion for judging the outcome of such allocation—there would 
seem to be no difficulty with OAR, since every participant is treated in a similar 
way, given current evidence from the trial. However, other readings of procedural 
justice, which Rawls calls perfect and imperfect procedural justice [45], require an 
independent assessment of the substantive outcome of the process of allocating ben-
efits and burdens.9 On this basis, it is hard not to be uneasy at the differing prospects 
of benefit for early versus late enrolment within OAR among participants who are 
‘otherwise equal’ [9, p. 64]. The procedure of allocation alone does not seem to pro-
vide sufficient reassurance, and independent justification of its outcome is needed.
One way to lessen this concern would be to appeal to the notion of choice. Pro-
vided that they are told how allocation probabilities may change, participants can 
decide for themselves what probability they find acceptable and time their enrol-
ment accordingly. However, such choice is not available to all. Necessarily, not all 
participants can choose to delay enrolment in order to secure favourable probabili-
ties, as such a decision is possible only insofar as others have already enrolled first. 
Additionally, it has been pointed out that, in many trials, those who are sicker or 
have a poorer prognosis cannot afford to delay enrolment [2], so not everyone can 
choose to join a study at a potentially advantageous time. Finally, concerns related 
to comprehension—to be addressed later—suggest that only those participants who 
fully understand the implications of changes in allocation probabilities would be 
able to exercise such choice effectively [10].10 Drawing on psychological research 
[46], Saxman suggests that there is a stronger appeal to fairness when individuals 
9 Within perfect procedural justice, a process of allocation can be defined that will guarantee a just sub-
stantive outcome (where such an outcome is defined in terms other than the allocation process per se). 
Within imperfect procedural justice, a just substantive outcome is not guaranteed, as ‘there is no feasible 
procedure which is sure to lead to it’ [45, p. 86].
10 If such choice as to the timing of enrolment were in fact feasible, it would raise issues for the internal 
validity of the study, as the changing randomization ratios would tend to be associated with changes in 
the characteristics of the participants being allocated [9, 10].
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know that their outcomes differ from those of others than when they are unaware of 
such differences [9, p. 64]. While this notion may explain perceptions of fairness or 
unfairness, more is required to settle the issue of whether a specific distribution is 
intrinsically fair. Appeals to choice, or to individuals’ perceptions, seem to translate 
the issue into one of autonomy, leaving the justice of differing levels of benefit and 
burden over the course of the trial in need of justification.
In Christopher Palmer’s view, the fact that late enrollees may do better than 
early enrollees is ‘what medical progress is all about anyway—treating tomorrow’s 
patients better than today’s’ [47, p. 395]. The appeal to clinical practice does not, 
however, appear apposite here. Advances in medical treatment are a welcome con-
sequence of research, but the time at which patients present for such treatment is a 
natural process, and hence the way in which the benefits of medical advances are 
distributed to patients over time is not a matter of human decision. In a trial, how-
ever, any differential distribution of therapeutic benefit arising from the design and 
conduct of the study is the responsibility of the investigator and requires a specific 
moral justification. Palmer also argues that early enrollees may be comforted by the 
knowledge that patients in trials tend to fare better than those outside trials [47]. 
This too does not seem to address the issue—the concern here is the fair treatment 
of individuals within a trial, not how they are treated in comparison to others outside 
the context of medical research.
Let me switch the focus now to the end of the trial. Steven Piantadosi states that 
a motivation for adaptive methods is ‘a desire to minimize the number of subjects 
entered on what will be shown to be the inferior treatment’ [48, p. 340] (empha-
sis added). This motivation points to a proleptic assumption about the outcome of 
the study that may be unwarranted. As Marc Buyse has indicated [4], the definitive 
conclusion reached on the treatments being tested may be at odds with the alloca-
tion that has occurred through OAR during the trial (owing to the imprecision with 
which the adaptive allocation probabilities are estimated from the data). Thus, the 
weighting of randomization throughout the trial at times may be in the direction of 
the inferior treatment, with the result that most participants will have received this 
ultimately disfavoured intervention [49, 50]. The moral objective of OAR is thereby 
wholly frustrated.
Even if OAR does weight allocation probabilities in line with the overall ver-
dict of the study, it is important to demonstrate that it has done so on the basis of 
sufficient and relevant evidence. Adjustment to randomization has to be made on 
the basis of data that are available in a timely manner, which will normally mean a 
short-term outcome. If longer-term outcomes are more relevant, but are not avail-
able to form the basis of such adjustment, the informational basis for changing ran-
domization probabilities may be incomplete (because other important information is 
unavailable) or unsound (because using only short-term information may not reflect 
a more global judgment that would be reached across all outcomes).11
11 Hey and Kimmelman discuss this issue with specific reference to phase 2 and phase 3 clinical trials 
[2]; see also Jack Lee [7]. The possibility that the criterion for adaptive randomization might be based 
on more than one outcome variable presents a challenge. In covariate-adaptive randomization, base-
line covariates can be differentially weighted in terms of their potential confounding influences—which 
might be determined empirically—and the randomization algorithm can be determined accordingly. In 
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A final ethical difficulty facing OAR is that of demonstrating why an accumula-
tion of evidence that, within E1, is considered sufficient to disturb equipoise, and 
thus to justify weighting randomization against one intervention on the grounds of 
its perceived inferiority, is not also a reason to stop the trial altogether, as would 
likely occur during a planned interim analysis in a trial using FRR. As noted earlier, 
the trialist employing OAR seemingly makes only a partial response to information 
suggesting that some participants will be disadvantaged by allocation to a particular 
treatment. By contrast, terminating the trial seems to address such a loss of equi-
poise head-on. Advocates of OAR need to provide a clear, non-arbitrary criterion 
to distinguish between the level of information that requires some participants to 
be diverted from the inferior treatment and the level of information that requires all 
participants to be so diverted by halting the trial.
This problem does not just relate to participants at the point of randomization. A 
similar argument could be made regarding certain participants already in the trial. If 
accruing information is sufficient to weight subsequent allocation towards the appar-
ently superior treatment, for reasons of consistency, should participants already on 
the inferior treatment not be moved across to the better treatment (if doing so is 
clinically feasible)? Clearly, doing so would undermine the scientific rigour of the 
trial, effectively reducing it to a cohort study, but not doing so would mean that par-
ticipants are maintained on the apparently inferior treatment for the sake of science, 
rather than to uphold individual ethics.
A reading of equipoise based on E1 seems to create important challenges for 
OAR. Having determined that trial data showing differential treatment effectiveness 
disturb equipoise, there is no clear means by which equipoise can be restored or its 
loss appropriately compensated for. Many of these challenges do not arise under E2, 
owing to its ability to maintain equipoise in the face of data that appear to favour 
one treatment over another. How participant welfare is regarded in RCTs based on 
OAR therefore depends significantly on how equipoise is construed.
Protecting participant autonomy
Like equipoise, consent is commonly regarded as an ethical prerequisite for RCTs, 
as a means of upholding participants’ autonomy. However, the moral force of con-
sent depends on its being adequately informed, as lack of information prevents 
meaningful choice and is thus a constraint on autonomy [51]. More specifically, in 
order to support autonomous choice, consent requires an appropriate equilibrium 
between disclosure and understanding. What potential participants are told should 
be sufficient to provide them with a sound factual basis for their decision, but should 
not be so detailed as to create confusion or information overload.
Footnote 11 (continued)
OAR, however, such outcomes would have to be weighted in terms of their relationship to a particular 
conceptualization of participant welfare. Determining the appropriate weightings in such terms would 
not be straightforward.
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There is, however, considerable empirical evidence that the understanding and 
recall required for consent to be informed are very hard to achieve [52, 53]. Satisfy-
ing these requirements of understanding and recall is likely to be particularly chal-
lenging when seeking to explain a method of allocation that adapts itself dynami-
cally during the course of the trial. Also, as Saxman indicates [9], participants need 
to understand that although accumulating data can cause randomization probabilities 
to change, they may still be allocated to the currently disfavoured treatment. Equally 
difficult may be explaining that the information on treatment response that causes 
changes to the allocation process at a particular time is only provisional, based on 
emerging trends, and that the definitive conclusion at the end of the trial may be dif-
ferent. Additionally, participants should understand that, owing to the small amount 
of data available, there is little on which to base the adaptive allocation to treat-
ment arms for the first few individuals enrolled in the study, whereas there is pro-
gressively more information on which to base allocation for later participants.12 It 
is likely, therefore, that the necessary balance between disclosure and understand-
ing will be hard to achieve; the complexity of the information required to permit an 
informed choice is likely to exceed many participants’ comprehension. Furthermore, 
this complexity may increase the likelihood of framing effects—cognitive biases 
whereby subtly different ways of presenting equivalent information may result in 
different choices [54]. These effects may weaken the validity of consent [55]. If, as a 
result of the potential difficulties outlined above,13 understanding on the part of the 
participant is inadequately achieved, consent loses much of its moral authority.
Furthermore, because allocation is based on a continuous re-appraisal of outcome 
data, information given to participants at the point of recruitment should be con-
stantly adjusted to reflect the most recent appraisal. Likewise, updated information 
should be provided to those already in the trial, as the information on which they 
based their original consent may now be outdated. Accordingly, not only should the 
details given to the first few individuals to enrol differ considerably from those given 
to individuals enrolling at a much later point in the study, but the latter information 
should also be provided to those already in the trial so that their continued consent 
can be affirmed. If accruing information is sufficiently persuasive to adjust randomi-
zation it is presumably sufficiently persuasive to be conveyed to both new and exist-
ing participants.
These difficulties related to consent do not directly undermine the appropriateness 
of OAR as a research design; but given that adequate understanding is a prerequisite 
12 As is indicated in earlier discussion, the role that such information plays will differ according to 
whether E1 or E2 is adopted as the underlying criterion of adaptive randomization. In either case, how-
ever, the requirement to tell participants that—and how—such information is to be used is essentially the 
same.
13 There is little empirical evidence in the specific context of OAR, but these assumptions seem reasona-
ble given what is known about information and recall in relation to consent. One experimental study that 
has examined comprehension of OAR found that, while self-rated understanding of OAR versus FRR did 
not differ, correct identification of the method of treatment allocation was significantly lower for those 
presented with a description of OAR than for those presented with a description of FRR [39]. It is also 
reasonable to think that challenges in terms of disclosure and comprehension are greater in a multi-arm 
than in a two-arm OAR trial.
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for consent and that consent is, in turn, a necessary condition prima facie for a trial’s 
being morally justified, they are challenges that must be addressed.14
The therapeutic misconception
An issue with important implications for consent is the so-called therapeutic mis-
conception [56]. This term denotes the tendency for participants to conflate clinical 
research and clinical practice—despite receiving detailed information clarifying the 
study’s scientific nature—thereby assuming that the treatment they receive in a trial 
will reflect their individual clinical needs, rather than the scientific goal of the study. 
In particular, the fact that treatment is determined by randomization, rather than 
clinical indication, may be misunderstood, and such misunderstanding undermines 
the adequacy of consent [57, 58]. Closely allied to this is the notion of therapeutic 
misestimation—a tendency to overestimate the benefits, or underestimate the harms, 
associated with trial participation [59].
Meurer et al. suggest that use of OAR may offset the therapeutic misconception 
by serving to ‘close the gap between what trial participants believe and what they 
experience’ [60, p. 2377]. In support of this claim, they point to the increasing prob-
ability that participants who join the trial later will receive the treatment ultimately 
found to be superior. However, given that the therapeutic misconception centres on 
the issue of individualized care, in order to show that the design of a trial mitigates 
this misconception, one would need to demonstrate that such a design adapts alloca-
tion to the individual participant’s clinical needs. This does not happen with OAR, 
which seeks only to adjust allocation in terms of aggregate treatment effectiveness. 
It remains a stochastic method of allocation, in which randomization probabilities 
are normally adjusted in relation to sequences of patients [61], rather than from one 
patient to the next, and it therefore does not align the allocation of trial interventions 
with the characteristics of particular individuals.
If anything, OAR is liable to reinforce, rather than alleviate, the therapeutic mis-
conception. Such reinforcement may happen in one of two ways. First, an explana-
tion of the process by which allocation is adjusted is likely to further reduce poten-
tial participants’ understanding that such allocation is still a random process, albeit 
weighted. Second, the indication that treatment allocation is influenced by evidence 
of differential clinical benefit may encourage participants to believe that treatment 
within an OAR trial will be tailored to the individual; they may mistake a change 
in allocation intended to favour participants in general for one directed at their spe-
cific clinical needs. Moreover, Hey and Kimmelman point out that the problem is 
likely to be most acute among participants allocated to the seemingly inferior arm of 
the study, as their allocation is most at variance with what they would expect under 
the therapeutic misconception [2]. Furthermore, apart from its effects on the thera-
peutic misconception, OAR may also encourage therapeutic misestimation. Having 
understood the notion that changing randomization ratios track emerging provisional 
14 Steven Joffe and Susan Ellenberg [5] as well as Bothwell and Kesselheim [12] consider some practical 
issues relating to obtaining consent with OAR.
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evidence of therapeutic benefit, participants may attach undue weight to this fact, 
overlooking the provisional nature of such evidence and assuming that one’s hav-
ing been randomized to the apparently superior treatment—given data collected thus 
far—is a strong, or even conclusive, indication that this is indeed the best interven-
tion. In this way, while those randomized to the worse-performing arm may be par-
ticularly susceptible to the therapeutic misconception, those randomized in the other 
direction may be particularly susceptible to therapeutic misestimation.
As noted earlier, in some circumstances, more participants in total may be allo-
cated to the inferior treatment than to the superior treatment, given the conclusion 
reached at the end of the study. Even if this situation does not characterize the trial 
as a whole, it may hold at a particular time within the trial’s duration—that is, at one 
or more points in the trial, OAR may favour the treatment ultimately shown to be 
inferior, even though randomization across the whole trial may prove to be weighted 
towards the superior treatment. In such cases, certain participants will have been 
randomized on what turns out to be unreliable information. The moral objection 
here is not that these patients should not have been allocated in this way at that time, 
as it is only in hindsight that the accuracy of allocation can be judged; rather, the 
objection is that the situation is likely to run counter to participants’ expectations, 
creating an additional form of misconception. While participants may understand 
that OAR randomizes preferentially in accordance with emerging evidence on treat-
ment benefit, it is far less likely that they will fully appreciate the reality that such 
allocation may turn out to be in the ‘wrong’ direction. They are likely to have given 
their consent on the assumption that randomization would be weighted towards the 
better treatment throughout.
Scientific validity of the trial
Although the primary importance of consent is clearly ethical, relating to considera-
tions of autonomy, the information provided as the basis for consent and the nature 
of the consent process may also have implications for the validity of the trial. These 
methodological considerations will, in turn, have ethical implications insofar as sci-
entific rigour is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for a study’s ethical 
justification [62]. If consent requires that participants be informed about the weight-
ing of randomization at the time of enrolment, then those who subsequently discover 
that they are in the disfavoured treatment arm may be more likely than other partici-
pants to drop out of the study [5], thereby undermining the statistical comparabil-
ity of the treatment groups. Similarly, if early enrollees should be informed of later 
changes in the weighting of randomization, as I argue above, then resentful demor-
alization or compensatory rivalry may ensue amongst those who find themselves in 
the disfavoured treatment arm, with a consequent biasing of outcomes.15 Further, 
15 Resentful demoralization describes a phenomenon whereby those perceiving themselves to be recipi-
ents of the less desirable intervention may become disheartened and respond less well. In contrast, com-
pensatory rivalry occurs when such individuals respond better in an attempt to offset the perceived disad-
vantage of receiving the less favourable intervention [63]. An additional possibility is switching—those 
aware that they are receiving the less desirable intervention may try to obtain the better alternative.
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obliging researchers to update participants on changes in allocation probabilities 
would likely preclude participant blinding in trials where treatment concealment is 
important. Similarly, the trialist would be unblinded as to the relative performance 
of the treatments being tested [10]. This lack of blinding could lead to bias, either 
in participants’ responses to treatment or in individual investigators’ recruitment 
behaviour or assessment of outcomes [64].
Conclusions
OAR gives rise to several ethical issues related to welfare and autonomy, and these 
issues are largely connected to the way in which OAR responds to changing informa-
tion during the trial (Fig. 1). Of course, if the null hypothesis is ultimately retained, 
then there is no ‘better’ or ‘worse’ treatment, and whichever arm participants were 
allocated to during the trial may seem inconsequential [6]. However, while such an 
outcome may obviate the problem of inappropriately weighted randomization, it 
also removes the intended benefit of OAR.
At the root of welfare-related issues in OAR is the notion of equipoise. If the 
advocate of OAR adopts the first model of equipoise that I have described, E1, then 
these issues are acute, as he or she is committed to regarding an intervention dis-
favoured by emerging data as inferior and thus as a threat to participant welfare. 
For an advocate of OAR who subscribes to E2, however, a disfavoured intervention 
retains legitimacy provided it is still recommended by some portion of the expert 
clinical community.
It would appear that OAR does not uphold—and therefore cannot appeal to—the 
notion of individual ethics, as allocation does not respond to the individual charac-
teristics or needs of each participant. Instead, OAR seems to rely more on collec-
tive than on individual ethics, focusing on the idea that, in aggregate, more patients 
will be allocated to the better treatment. Thus, when Daryl Pullman and Xikui Wang 
Few data initially 
on which to base 
allocation
Accruing data 
begin to favour 
one treatment
PROGRESS OF THE STUDY
Requirement to 
change 
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Fig. 1  Ethical issues arising during the progress of a trial with outcome-adaptive randomization
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argue that OAR seeks to ‘treat as many patients as effectively or successfully as pos-
sible’ [18, p. 204], they retreat from individual to collective ethics. Unfortunately, 
OAR may not fare well once viewed in terms of collective ethics: although the pro-
portion of patients allocated to the better treatment under OAR is greater than under 
FRR, the number of such patients may not be—and when choosing between these 
two designs, it is surely the number, not the proportion, that should feature in the con-
sequentialist balancing of benefit and harm that lies at the heart of collective ethics. 
Thus, the claim that OAR protects individual ethics in the context of RCTs appears 
to be unfounded. Instead, much of the ethical rationale for OAR is centred in col-
lective ethics, and upon entering that territory, it appears to fare worse than FRR. 
In fact, it can be argued more generally that the pursuit of individual over collective 
ethics is misplaced in clinical trials. The purpose of such studies is to generate valid 
conclusions as to aggregate treatment effectiveness, and this requires individual clini-
cal decision-making to be at least partly subordinated to the demands of the research 
design—as the therapeutic misconception indicates. In the final analysis, clinical 
trials are concerned with reaching a decision about patients as collectivities rather 
than as individuals. Consequently, with some exceptions (e.g., monitoring for adverse 
events in individual participants or ensuring that consent is still in place), ethical con-
cern is with the collective welfare of participants in the study, not with the welfare of 
each participant taken individually. Pursuing the latter—such as by trying to allocate 
each participant according to his or her specific clinical presentation rather than by a 
wholly random mechanism—is likely to run counter to the methodological demands 
of the study. This is not to deny that patients may benefit by participating in clinical 
trials [65], but it indicates that such benefits are not individuated.
Trials based on OAR raise questions regarding the different prospects of benefit 
for early versus late enrollees and regarding the way in which emerging information 
seems to determine the handling of new recruits but not participants already in the 
study. In addition, while clear empirical evidence may be lacking, it is reasonable 
to think that OAR presents considerable challenges for disclosure on the part of the 
researcher and for comprehension on the part of the participant. Particular problems 
in this regard centre on the notions of therapeutic misconception and therapeutic 
misestimation.
Some of the concerns that have been outlined in respect of OAR can be mitigated 
by design modifications. For example, the likelihood of weighting randomization 
to the ‘wrong’ treatment can be reduced by restricting the range of randomization 
probabilities or by employing an initial burn-in with equal randomization [50, 66]; 
and using baseline information through a more elaborate process of covariate-adap-
tive response-adaptive randomization might bring treatment allocation closer to the 
individual patient [67, 68].16 However, there remain other ethical difficulties with 
OAR that are less amenable to reparative strategies at the level of design.
16 Some design modifications that aim to strengthen OAR trials have associated disadvantages. Greater 
efficiency in a multi-arm OAR trial may be gained by maintaining the size of the control group at that of 
the best-performing active treatment arm. However, this modification would undercut the ethical motiva-
tion of OAR by preventing preferential randomization to this arm in comparison to the control arm [10].
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Does fixed‑ratio randomization fare better?
The advocate of OAR—or, at least, one who subscribes to E1—might argue that 
FRR fares no better. One criticism might be that by taking no account of accumu-
lating data on treatment effectiveness, other than at specific interim analyses, FRR 
simply ignores information relevant to participants’ welfare [7]. Worse yet, so the 
objection might run, the FRR trialist is prepared to randomize 50% of participants 
to the seemingly inferior treatment in the face of such information, whereas OAR 
strives to randomize fewer. Thus, Palmer contends that ‘possible 9:1 randomization 
in adaptive designs … remains a better deal for participants than 1:1 randomization’ 
[47, p. 393], and Pullman and Wang argue that the last patient enrolled in a trial 
employing FRR has only a 50% chance of receiving the better treatment, though this 
chance is much higher for the first patient treated after completion of the trial [18, 
p. 208]. One response on behalf of FRR could be that no account is taken of accru-
ing, as opposed to interim, evidence because it is insufficiently informative. Stuart 
Pocock states that the principal role of interim analyses is ‘to look for treatment dif-
ferences which are sufficiently convincing and important to stop or change the trial’ 
[24, p. 143]. On this basis, it might be argued that accruing data, assessed pari passu 
with participant allocation, do not constitute ‘convincing’ evidence and therefore do 
not substantiate any claim that participants have received, or failed to receive, the 
better treatment during the course of the trial; such evidence may be obtained only 
through a formal statistical evaluation at a prespecified interim analysis.17 As a sec-
ond rejoinder, advocates of interim analyses in the context of FRR might claim to 
respond more fully to a loss of equipoise by halting the trial or perhaps dropping a 
treatment group, in contrast to the somewhat partial and inconsistent response in the 
context of OAR.
Donald Berry defends OAR against charges of inefficiency by indicating that 
in some cases where there are both safety and efficacy objectives, a randomization 
ratio of 4:1 may be more efficient, in terms of the required number of participants, 
than a ratio of 1:1 [3]. However, this argument appears to be one favouring unequal 
over equal randomization in such circumstances rather than one favouring OAR over 
FRR. Advocates of FRR need not insist on 1:1 randomization; they would simply 
require that if imbalances in treatment arms brought about by OAR reduce effi-
ciency, this should be justified by countervailing ethical considerations.
With regard to consent, both OAR and FRR face challenges in the way of achiev-
ing appropriate disclosure and comprehension, particularly in relation to randomiza-
tion. However, even if these objectives are imperfectly met in FRR, they are prob-
ably achieved to a lesser extent in OAR. A straightforward process of randomization 
is likely to be easier to explain and understand than one framed in terms of changing 
17 This counterargument depends, however, on the appropriate number and timing of interim analyses. 
If such analyses are too few, or occur too infrequently, or adopt an unsuitable statistical threshold for ter-
mination of the trial [69, 70], there is a sense in which a trial based on FRR would indeed be open to the 
charge of taking inadequate account of relevant information.
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probabilities of allocation, and difficulties with the therapeutic misconception or 
therapeutic misestimation are likely to be more acute in OAR.
Overall, and depending in part on the construal of equipoise that underlies its use, 
a moral case for OAR in terms of welfare and autonomy has yet to be established.
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